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INTERPRETATION OF THE WRITTEN LAW
It is sometimes said that law is applied logic, and almost
always the person making this statement has in mind exclusively
the deductive or analytical form of logic. Obviously this epi-
grammatic statement has a very strong foundation of truth.
Deductive logic is a mental operation the lawyer must employ
many times every day. The application of law to given states
of fact commonly proceeds by a series of syllogisms, in such
manner that the rule of law forms the major, the facts the minor
premise, and the resulting conclusion the judgment: Whoever
kills another is guilty of homicide; A has killed B; therefore
A is guilty of homicide.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that this form of reason-
ing is by no means, as has frequently been imagined, the only
form which legal science employs, but that the opposite or induc-
tive form is constantly called in to aid the finding of a just con-
clusion. This also is by no means a novel proposition, but it
would seem that the necessity for inductive or synthetic reason-
ing is more often vaguely felt than clearly recognized. This
feeling sometimes gives rise to the criticism of decisions as being
"scholastic," meaning that they are based altogether on deduc-
tion from an assumed minor premise; without regard to the
specific social circumstances of the case which can be brought
into the reasoning only by an inductive or synthetic process.
Our considerations will be confined principally to legal logic
as applied to the written law, in the hope that we may not only
help to obtain a clearer view of the process of interpretation in
general, but throw some light on the question, in what cases a
so-called strict construction of constitutions and statutes is
proper, and under what circumstances the obvious meaning of
the text should be extended by what is commonly called liberal
or broad interpretation to subjects not at first glance covered by
the wording of the act. Heretofore the choice of one or the other
of these methods has rarely been made with clear consciousness
of the reasons, but rather on the basis of subjective predilections
influenced by temperament, training, political convictions, eco-
nomic or social preferences. The subject is far too vast to be
treated exhaustively in a brief magazine article, and the most we
can do therefore is to suggest some new points of view from
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which a more elaborate survey of the subject may be made in
the future.
We shall begin with calling attention to several different direc-
tions in which one may travel when he attempts to interpret the
meaning of written laws. It seems that anyone looking for
principles of interpretation would first hit upon the rather obvious
idea that the statute should be given the meaning which will
express the actual intention of the legislator when the law was
enacted. Consequently we find this principle widely advocated,
and historically it is probably the first to be maintained. Soon,
however, difficulties were discovered in following out this theory.
Who is the legislator? The legislative body which passed the
act? Then we shall almost invariably find that different members
understood the meaning differently. Even if we confine the term
"legislator" to the majority voting in favor of adopting the bill,
that may still be the case. I-ow then shall we determine what
the legislator really meant? By analyzing the debates? They
may not be fully reported. By listening to the opinions of mem-
bers after the passage of the act? That would be plainly im-
practicable. Sometimes it is suggested that the legislator is not
the body which by an authoritative vote enacted the bill into
law, but rather the person or persons who drew the bill. That,
however, would get us little farther. For we should still have
to find extraneous evidence to discover what the draftsmen meant,
the moment a doubt arises. In other words, to interpret a statute
in accordance with the intention of the legislator may seem super-
ficially reasonable, but involves in many cases an inquiry into
facts, where the evidence would either be wholly lacking or else
be exceedingly voluminous and in all cases uncertain to the
highest degree, so as to make it quite unadapted to the practical
work of administering justice.
In the face of these difficulties, a second theory has obtained
wide sway. According to this, the actual intention of the
legislator is quite immaterial; what matters is the way in which
he has actually expressed his intention. We must look to the
wording of the statute, and to that alone. This theory would, no
doubt, work admirably if all statutes were models of legislative
style, and expressed with perfect lucidity, without an unneces-
sary word nor lacking any expression needed to make the mean-
ing clear. If that were the character of our statutes, as a
matter of fact, we should not need to bother about any theory
of interpretation; every act would explain itself. We all know,
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of course, that statutes are very far from well-drawn, as a rule.
The very manner of their adoption, by being subject to amend-
ment in the heat of debate, prevents their being perfectly clear;
it is even said that sometimes they are intentionally made ambigu-
ous, in order to induce various classes of members to vote for
them who really have quite inconsistent legislative intentions.
All this is true in every country where laws are made by large
bodies, but in the United States we have the trouble in an aggra-
vated form, on account of our somewhat extraordinary belief that
any person capable of dictating to a stenographer, and certainly
every person who somehow has managed to be admitted to the
bar of some court and consequently may call himself a lawyer,
is quite competent to draw a legislative bill. Under these cir-
cumstances, the interpretation of a statute and the construction
of its ambiguous passage is one of the most difficult tasks to
which trained intelligence may be applied.
This theory, however, is most generally adopted among lawyers,
and finds expression in innumerable decisions. The difficulties
of the task have led the courts to adopt a number of logical
subterfuges, the sophistical nature of which is really apparent
to all who look beneath the surface, but which are tacitly accepted
as sufficient whenever they result in the realization of substantial
justice. For after all, legal science and the courts exist for the
practical purpose of maintaining social order and not for the
sake of vindicating the principles of logic.
It would be impossible to enumerate, and still less to analyse,
the great variety of these devices by which the courts seek to
read into poorly drawn statutes practical meanings they do not
really express. Any text book on the subject will furnish in
the cases it cites an abundant crop of illustrations. Some of these
devices have been fortified by a set of presumptions which by
long tradition have assumed the character of legal rules. Thus
it must be presumed that the meaning of the statute cannot be
an absurdity; that every part, down to the individual words and
even the commas and other punctuation, has a meaning; that
the legislature intended to do nothing unconstitutional; that it
acted in the light of full knowledge of the whole system of the
law, not to mention various other presumptions enumerated in
the text books.- Another favorite device is that of using a word
'The following illustrative cases might easily be multiplied: City of
Jefferson v. WeeMs, 5 Ind. 547; In re Low Yam Chow, 7 Sawy. 546;
Bailey v. Commonwealth, 74 Ky. 688; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal.
518; Little v. Bowers, 48 N. J. L. 37o.
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in a sense which it has never borne before, and of which the
legislator, whoever he be, pretty certainly never dreamed, but
which will indeed make the statute practicable-which as was
said above is really the primary purpose of courts of law. An
illustration of this sort of twisting a word from its meaning is
the universal inclusion of typewriting in the meaning of "writ-
ing" as used in statutes passed long before typewriters were
invented. As a matter of fact, the typewriter is far more analo-
gous to the printing press than to the pen, and there was a brief
hesitation whether its use should not be classed as printing,
rather than writing.2 The obviously inconvenient results which
would have flowed therefrom caused the court to let logic give
way to practical sense. In connection with the same word
"writing" an even more extraordinary instance of twisting the
sense to get practical results is found in copyright law. The
only authority Congress has for legislating on the subject is found
in Art. 1, §8, subs. 8, U. S. Constitution, where power is given
to protect the "writings of authors." In the very first copy-
right act passed by Congress, maps and charts were included as
"writings." These, as well as drawings and paintings, may at
least be made by a manipulation similar to writing, with pen,
pencil or brush; but how can that be said of photography and
sculpture? Yet by common consent these are included among
the legitimate subjects of federal copyright. The court has not
even deemed it worth while to argue the case at length.2
The complications arising out of the interpretation of statutes
from the text of the act alone are increased by the fundamental
principle regarding the development of American law, the rule
of "stare decisis." Historically, the principle of interpreting
according to the intention of the legislator was well established
by precedent before its difficulties were realized. Consequently,
the courts were unable to abandon it frankly and in so many
words. That would have been "judicial legislation," which
according to another doctrine well established by judicial and
legislative precedent, is an encroachment on the prerogative of
the legislative branch of the government. Accordingly, courts
and text book writers continue solemnly to declare that to-day
2 See Franco-Amnerican Loan & Building Association v. Joy, 61 Mo.
App. io2; State v. City of Oakland, 69 Kans. 784.
'See Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 591, for
photography. The question of sculpture as "writing" has never even
been raised in court, it seems.
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as ever the object of interpretation is to discover the intention
of the legislator. This principle "is universally recognized, is
constantly stated by them as the basis for their action in matters
of this kind, and is supported by the unanimous voice of the
authorities." 4 All of which is perfectly correct.
At the same time we have already seen that at an early date
the courts, while nominally maintaining the earlier doctrine, in
reality applied the second doctrine of interpretation, according to
which it does not matter what the legislator really intended, but
only what he has actually expressed in the statute or constitu-
tion. We are bound to assume that whatever we can read out of,
or into, the text, by the help of the presumptions and other
devices mentioned above, is the intention of the legislator. As
a matter of fact, we know positively in some cases, and have most
excellent reasons to suspect in others, that the legislature at least,
if not the actual author of the bill, never did intend anything of
the sort. Yet the courts are entirely justified in making these
assumptions. Their business is to maintain social order, not to
vindicate the claims of logic. They must interpret statutes so
as to make them adequate to the needs of society, and they must
recognize the rule of "stare decisis" or the whole fabric of our
legal system may collapse.
However, precisely as the courts have not, in reality, adhered
to the original doctrine of the intention of the legislator, they have
not remained bound by the supplemental theory of finding the
meaning from the text alone. How could they do so, in those
cases where there actually was no meaning to some provision
of the statute, or at least no meaning that could be reasonably
applied to some of the states of fact it was apparently intended
to cover? Consequently the strictness of the principle was
mitigated by the rule, that in such cases certain vague formulae
may be called into action which are to put into the statute what-
ever may be necessary to make it a practicable rule even though
the text by itself be nonsensical. Such formulae are "the spirit
and reason of the law," "the scope and purpose of the act,"
sometimes even the "equity and convenience of the case." 5 All
these are equally useful also when the difficulty is not so much
that the statute has no intelligible meaning, as that it has several
'Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 47. Note the formidable list of
cases cited in the same place.
'Associates, etc. v. Davison, 29 N. J. L. 415.
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possible meanings among which a choice must necessarily be
made.
Now the question arises, naturally, how are these formulae
themselves to be interpreted? For taken as they stand, there is
hardly any concrete meaning in them at all; they are like a
frame work which must be filled up with the definite and tangible
material they are intended to hold.
This is the point where analytical or deductive reasoning no
longer suffices. The characteristic of that form of thinking is
that the very result of our reasoning is already contained in the
premise from which we start. All we have to do is to bring it to
light. Now, however, we have come to a point where there is no
content-we have merely a frame work, a phrase, or to use a
philosophical term, a "form," such as "the spirit and reason of
the law." The only way in which we can discover the material
to fill the frame work is to observe the external facts of the sub-
ject matter-including among "facts" not only sensual but also
psychological phenomena. From a large number of observed
cases of similar nature we may then gather, by induction, a prop-
osition regarding some quality common to all of them. This com-
mon quality will be the matter with which we may fill our frame
work-in other words, it will be the "spirit and reason of the
law," the "scope and purpose of the act," or the "equity and
convenience of the case." We may still call this sort of interpre-
tation an attempt to find the will of the legislator, by assuming
that the legislator must have made the same sort of observation
of external facts as we have made, and fitted his statute to suit
them. That may or may not be actually true-obviously, it ought
to be true in all cases. It is possible, however, that the facts to
be observed are different when the court is called upon to inter-
pret the law from those existing when the legislator made it.
Then the question must come up: Which set of facts is to be
considered? If we are to make those before the eyes of the
legislator the basis of interpretation, we shall not only run the risk
of not being able to get a thorough knowledge of data that .may
have disappeared in the interval, but also the much greater
danger of giving to the statute a meaning entirely inappropriate
to existing circumstances. We should be playing into the hands
of radicals afflicted with the reforming mania, while it is one of
the essential qualities of every well-organized system of law to
be conservative.
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If, however, it is conceded that the circumstances from which
we may learn the spirit, the reason, scope or purpose of the law
are the circumstances of the present, we may from the fact that
the legislator as well as the interpreter must look to external facts
for his guidance obtain a hint regarding the. true foundation
principle of interpretation. This is neither the will of the legis-
lator, pure and simple, nor the will of the legislator as he has
actually expressed it in the text of the statutes. In all cases of
doubt regarding the meaning of the words, the text should be
construed to mean that which the legislator would himself have
expressed if he had been in possession of all the relevant facts
which the court finds to exist at the time of rendering its decision.
This does not mean, of course, that the court is to be at liberty
to substitute for the provisions of the statute other provisions
which he deems to be more closely adapted to the circumstances
of the time, but that of several possible constructions that is to
be chosen which is most apt, under the circumstances actually
existing, to lead to the desired result, to wit: the maintenance of
social order.
By following this rule, we shall accomplish a double end: We
are thereby recognizing the fact that the social order changes,
and that a legal provision which had indisputably beneficial effects
a hundred years ago may not have the same good results if
applied to-day in precisely the same manner. We may conceive
for instance, that in the year 179 o every consideration of good
order and morality would lead a Connecticut judge to construe
the Sunday law as forbidding a young farmer to take his sweet-
heart for a pleasure drive on Sunday afternoon, while in the
year 1915 a provision expressed in precisely the same words in
a Wisconsin statute would not be interpreted as prohibiting a
chauffeur from driving his employer through the park during
church time. The other result obtained by adopting a principle
of interpretation such as we have formulated above is the recog-
nition of the fact that the meaning of words changes in the
course of years, so that an interpretation reasonable enough at
one time becomes quite unreasonable at another. The case of
the typewriter, cited above, seems again to be as good a case as
can be found. At the present time to print on the typewriter is
called writing even in ordinary conversation, while surely in
i8oo nobody would have included any of the forms of printing
then known within the term "writing."
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It would seem to be no more unreasonable to indulge in the
presumption that the legislator intended his statute to establish
a principle, the application of which may be modified in accord-
ance with changing circumstances, than to indulge in any of the
other presumptions which by numerous precedents are made
unquestioned parts of the law of interpretation. Certainly it is
no more so than the presumption, or rather fiction, that in passing
a statute the legislature was aware of and actually considered the
whole body of our common and statute law, not to mention
equity. As a matter of fact we know that, during the life of a
statute, as one case after the other comes up under it showing
some few of the infinite combinations of fact that are possible but
cannot be foreseen by any human being, a number of relations
between the statute and other rules of law are discovered which
the legislator could not possibly have had in mind when he
enacted the statute. Nor is our proposed rule of interpretation
farther from the actual facts of the legislative process than the
other unquestioned principle of interpretation according.to which
every word and syllable of the act is presumed to have a care-
fully calculated meaning and purpose. In reality we know that
the text of very many statutes is carelessly drawn without the
slightest realization of the difficulties a single ill-chosen word, a
single awkward grammatical construction, or one superfluous
phrase may cause to litigants and courts. On the other hand, it
would seem natural enough that a legislature composed of intel-
ligent members actually did recognize the truth that social cir-
cumstances, including the meaning of words, are in a constant
flux, and that the interpretation of the text at any given time ought
to follow these changes, as long as the principle contained in the
act is maintained; in fact they may well be presumed to realize
that the principle can often be maintained only by adapting the
interpretation of details to the changes of external circumstances.
It may be asserted, therefore, that our canon of interpretation,
according to which in cases of doubt that construction must be
chosen which the legislator would have expressed if he had
legislated at the moment when the interpretation is made, is
entirely in harmony with the traditional theory of finding the
intention of the legislator, subject to the accepted presumptions.
The legislator may reasonably be presumed to have intended
precisely that rule.
As a matter of fact, the rule has been followed, in proper
cases, a great many times, although the true reason for it has
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not been supplied, it seems, in any of the published decisions.
In at least two fields of law, the courts are proceeding in this
manner constantly, although they rarely take occasion to set out
their steps of reasoning further than to refer to those vague
formulae we have described above as mere frame works. These
two fields are that of municipal ordinances and by-laws of other
corporations, the validity of which is attacked on the ground that
they are unreasonable; and the much wider province of -the police
power. In all these cases, the question of the true scope and
meaning or the validity of a statute or by-law must necessarily
be decided in the light of all the surrounding circumstances which
may either be such as are within the judicial knowledge of the
court or may appear from the evidence in the case. In all these
instances, the mental operation by which the court arrives at
his decision is clearly that which we have described, the observa-
tion of a large number of facts and the recognition of their
common characteristics, which is tested by the fundamental pur-
pose of maintaining the social order and thus becomes "the
reason and spirit of the law."
The presumption regarding the intention of the legislator that
the principle enacted by his statute shall be interpreted so as to
adapt its applications to the successive changes in the social
environment, also suggests what may be the true theory of the
different ways of interpreting which'go by the name of strict or
narrow construction on the one hand .and liberal or broad con-
struction on the other. The presumption implies that there is a
difference between what we have called the principle, constitut-
ing a broad, general provision to accomplish certain ends, and the
applications which refer to the method by which this general
provision can be made effective in each particular state of facts.
This method of making the principle effective as applied to some
particular state of facts may be called the rule of the case. The
difference between a principle and a rule thus indicated is not
confined to the written law; it pervades the whole realm of legal
action. Fo- instance, it is a principle that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
It is a rule, by which this principle is made effective, that every
person unlawfully deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus. From the illustration just given it is
apparent that rules, as distinguished from principles, may them-
selves be of a general nature and embodied either in the common
law or in constitutions and statutes.
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Now it appears to me that in this distinction between principle
and rule we have the clue to the question regarding the occasions
when a liberal and when a strict construction of a statute or other
written law is proper. Provisions embodying principles should be
liberally construed; mere rules, on the other hand, are not to be
extended beyond their expressed meaning.
This proposition is sure to be misunderstood unless we first
take the trouble of clearing our minds regarding the precise
meaning of liberal and strict construction.
Every legal provision, as in fact every expression of thought,
in human language, contains what is known as a concept or
notion of some thing or action, either physical or mental. The
concept comprehends a number of qualities or attributes which
in the aggregate constitute a class. These attributes are not all
represented in the mind with equal clearness, when the concept
is thought of. Just as in physical vision only one point in the
field covered by the eye is perceived with entire distinctness,
while all others are seen in various degrees of indistinctness,
increasing towards the periphery of the field, so the mental vision
will concentrate attention with clearness on one or a very few-
of the attributes constituting the concept. Around this there will
be a twilight zone; but by shifting the attention a little, a new
point will be brought into distinctness and the extent of the con-
cept will be changed although the identity of the concept is not
destroyed. It is impossible, therefore, to draw sharply defined
lines around any concept; there will always be a zone of which
one cannot say with positiveness that it is or is not within it.
Strict construction may be defined as that method which refuses
to include within any concept it finds in the text of the law any-
thing except the point that is perfectly clear in the mental field
of vision. Liberal construction, on the other hand, includes
within the concept more or less of the surrounding zone indis-
tinctly perceived when the attention is directed to the central
point of the concept. A construction, however, is not liberal
simply because, in the course of social change, the word express-
ing a concept has altered its meaning. Thus it is in the case
of the concept "writing." If to-day we include therein printing
on the typewriter, it is not because we now give to the term a
liberal construction while formerly it was construed strictly. We
are still using, so to speak, only so much of the concept "writing"
as is within the clear mental vision of any person expressing it,
for everybody now means to include typewriting when he says
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"write." One may say, therefore, that the ancient concept of
writing has changed to something else by society-in this case by
extending it to cover an activity somewhat different in character
from the ordinary forms of writing. In other cases, the social
change may be in the direction of narrowing the field, or it may
be a transposition to an entirely different set of attributes. Such
social extension, however, is not meant by the term liberal con-
struction. That expression is applicable when the interpreter
himself extends the meaning of a term to something which lies
merely within the twilight zone surrounding the clearly under-
stood notions in a concept, but is not usually included by the
person employing the term. For instance, a town ordinance may
regulate the running at large of "horses and cows" on the
highways. It would be a.legitimate use of liberal construction
if the court were to extend the concept cow to cover a heifer,
although none of the farmers of the neighborhood would ever
dream of calling a heifer a cow.
The court, construing such an ordinance, will discover from
his examination of the social circumstances, such as the amount
of traffic on the highway, the mischief such animals may be
expected to do if allowed to run at large, and the trifling char-
acter of the inconvenience the restriction imposes on the owners,
the reason for and scope of the law, that is, the extent which the
framers of the ordinance meant to give to the principle thereby
established. Accordingly, he very properly extends the ordinance
to similar animals not expressly mentioned. Now let us suppose
that the ordinance directs the path-master, hog-reeve or other
rustic dignitary to take animals found at large to the public
pound. That provision would not be a principle but a rule,
designed to put the principle of keeping animals under restraint
into effect. Would the court be justified in construing this
provision broadly so as to allow the hog-reeve to take the guilty
heifer to his own barn instead of the public pound? Clearly not.
For the public pound was established for the express purpose
of enabling the owner to find his obstreperous ward and getting
her out of prison by paying fine and fees. If the animal might
be taken elsewhere, this purpose could not be accomplished.
The reason why in the one case a liberal and in the other a strict
construction appears most conducive to attaining the single end
all law has in view, to wit: the maintenance of social order,
seems to appear clearly enough from the simple illustration just
furnished. A legal principle is a regulation covering a relatively
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broad field of social activity. Within the concept embodying it,
there are comprised a great many things, each of which might
become the center of attention without producing in the mind of
the thinker the feeling that it is no longer even within the twilight
zone of the concept-that as a matter of fact the uttermost bound-
ary of the concept has been exceeded. The opposite is true of a
mere rule. This covers a narrow field only-and the moment
you step aside from the center of the concept you are in danger
of transgressing the outer boundary surrounding the group of
ideas forming the narrow concept embodied in the rule.
If this general principle of interpretation, according to which
the concepts used in a legal provision may be interpreted to
include their twilight zones whenever the provision embodies a
principle (liberal construction), but should be confined to the
things clearly within the mind of the'speaker when he uses the
word expressing the concept in cases of mere rules (strict con-
struction), is tested by the accepted canons, such as that remedial
statutes should receive a liberal, penal provisions a strict con-
struction, it will be found to be entirely in consonance with them.
It seems to me, however, that the application of the canons will
become easier and less arbitrary than it now is when the under-
lying principle as here set out is thoroughly understood. The
principle, however, will probably be found to be incompatible
with those traditional rules from which the more modern decisions
are trying to emancipate themselves. I have in mind particularly
the ancient precept that "statutes in derogation of the common
law must be strictly construed." This and a few other traditional
rules cannot, it must be admitted, be reconciled with the principle
advocated above. To discuss the question whether the principle
or the traditional rules should be preferred, would require a
separate magazine article, to say the least. For it would involve
the whole problem of the mutual relations of the common and
the written law, and the value of each as a source of legal
principles.
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